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COMMENTS
INSURERS' LIABILITY FOR EXCESS JUDGMENTS IN VIRGINIA:
NEGLIGENCE OR BAD FAITH?
I. INTRODUCTION
Liability insurers have become increasingly concerned over the possibil-
ity that they may be responsible for satisfying excess judgments.' This
concern is justified.2 In Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,3 the California
Supreme Court generated new developments in insurance law by predi-
cating an insurer's liability for failing to settle claims against its insured
upon a finding of mere negligence.4 Traditionally, an insurer was held lia-
ble for an excess judgment only if the insured was able to bear the burden
of showing that the company acted in "bad faith" in failing to settle a
claim.5 Virginia adopts this traditional view.6
The purpose of this comment is to consider whether Virginia should
reevaluate its standard of liability in light of the Crisci decision. An his-
1. The possibility of an excess judgment arises where a claimant sues an insured for an
amount exceeding the insured's policy limit The insurer decides to defend the case in court
rather than settle for an amount equal to or within the policy limits. The resulting verdict is
greater than the policy limit. Unable to pay the difference between the judgment and its
insurance coverage, the insured brings an excess liability suit against the insurer.
2. The concern is evidenced by numerous articles advising the insurer on how to properly
conduct settlement situations to avoid possible liability. See generally Hume, New Bad
Faith Litigation and Practical Suggestions for Avoiding Excess Liability, 21 FED'N OF INS.
COUNSEL Q. 95 (1970); Luvaas, Excess Judgments - Defense Counsel's Liability, 18 DEF.
L.J. 259 (1969); Parks & Heil, Insurers Beware: "Bad Faith" is in Full Bloom, 9 FORUM 63
(1973); Wymore, Safeguarding Against Claims in Excess of Policy Limits, 11 FED'N OF INS.
COUNSEL Q. 9 (1960).
3. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
4. Some courts referred to a "negligence" standard in assessing an insurer's liability for
excess judgments prior to the Crisci decision. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 186-90 (1955).
The criteria established in Crisci, though called a basis for negligence, seems to fall more
appropriately between negligence and strict liability. Because it is almost impossible for an
insurer to overcome the "presumption of negligence" when it fails to settle a claim within
policy limits, the Crisci decision has in fact been interpreted to provide strict liability. See
Crisci's Dicta of Strict Liability for Insurers' Failure to Settle: A Move Toward Rational
Settlement Behavior, 43 WASH. L. REv. 799 (1968).
5. This second standard has been inversely labeled the "good faith" standard.
6. The only case in Virginia which has decided the question of an insurer's liability for
excess judgments is Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Price, 206 Va. 749, 146 S.E.2d 220 (1966).
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toric overview of early court decisions and an examination of the develop-
ment of the negligence and good faith standards as they are used by the
courts today will be presented.' The advantages and disadvantages of
each standard will be delineated in light of selected institutional and so-
cial concerns.
II. HISTORIC OVERVIEW
The early cases held that an insurer was under no duty to settle a claim
against its insured, even if the terms of a settlement were below policy
limits and should have been accepted to avoid a 'Possible excess judg-
ment.8 This freedom to control the settlement of claims stemmed from
the insurance policy itself.9 Any terms regarding settlements were permis-
sive in nature, rather than mandatory, so that the insurer could exercise
its discretion in deciding whether to settle or litigate.
These insurance policies were known as adhesion contracts 0 since they
placed the insurer in a very advantageous position vis-a-vis the insured.,1
When an insurer failed to settle a claim within policy limits, it was, in
7. This comment limits its discussion to these two standards. Several commentators have
however posed strict liability as an alternative to both standards. See Keeton, Liability In-
surance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1136 (1954); Note, Insurer's
Refusal to Settle - A Proposal for Imposition of Liability Above Policy Limits, 60 YALE L.J.
1037 (1951); Crisci's Dicta of Strict Liability for Insurers' Failure to Settle: A Move To-
ward Rational Settlement Behavior, supra note 4.
8. New Orleans & C.R. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 114 La. 153, 38 So. 89 (1905); Rumford
Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 A. 503(1899); Best Bldg. Co. v. Em-
ployers' Liab. Assur. Co., 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928); Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923); C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,
244 Pa. 286, 90 A. 653 (1914).
9. A typical clause reads: "As respects the insurance afforded by the other terms of this
policy ... the company shall: (a) defend any suit against the insured ... even if such suit
is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation, negotia-
tion and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient. Keeton, supra note 7,
at 1137 n.1 (emphasis added).
10. An adhesion contract is usually a standardized, mass produced contract drawn in
favor of a party with an immensely greater bargaining power than the consumer with whom
it deals. The weaker party must "adhere" to the terms of the form contract if he wants the
goods at all. No bargaining is engaged in with respect to it. J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CON-
TRACTs § 350, at 737-38 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
Insurance policies are still considered to be adhesion contracts. R. KEErrON, BASIC TEXT ON
INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(a), at 350 (1971). Their harsh effects, however, have been somewhat
alleviated by judicial and legislative regulation of the conduct of insurers.
11. Not only did the insurer enjoy exclusive control over settlement decisions, but it also
foreclosed the insured from making any settlements or compromises on his own. Appleman,
Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L. J. 100, 101 (1937).
[Vol. 15:153
EXCESS JUDGMENTS
effect, gambling with the insured's money.12 The insured was powerless to
change this state of affairs because early court decisions encouraged this
unequal relationship by applying strict contract principles in determining
the insurer's liability. s Thus, the insurer enjoyed immunity from liability
until the early twentieth century. 4
Courts gradually began to recognize that the insurer and insured do not
deal at arm's length with one another. In Brassil v. Maryland Casualty
Co.,15 the court decided that although the insurer literally complied with
the written terms of its contract with the insured by defending the pre-
liminary suit, the insurer was still liable for breach of contract because it
failed to bear its "obligation of good faith" in carrying out what was writ-
ten in the contract."' This obligation of good faith, underlying all written
agreements, required the insurer to prosecute an appeal on behalf of its
insured. Thus, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was
breathed into the insurance contract." This implied covenant imposed a
duty on the insurer to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured, and
prohibited either party from doing anything which would injure the right
12. For example, if an insurer refuses to settle a case within the limit of the policy and a
verdict in excess of the limit is rendered at trial, the insurer is liable only for the amount of
the policy limit. The insured is responsible for payment of any amount over the limit. This
presents a classic example of a "conflict of interests" between the insurer and the insured.
The insured's interests are best served by settling the claim within the policy limits, thereby
avoiding any risk of liability for a large excess verdict. The insurer often prefers taking the
chance of litigating the claim in an effort to "save money on the policy" by possibly keeping
the verdict within the policy limits or defending the suit successfully. Keeton, supra note 7,
at 1145.
13. The courts expressly held that the rights of the parties were determined by the agree-
ment into which they entered. As one opinion stated:
Whether the interests of the assured are in all respects sufficiently guarded by the
stipulations in the contract, it is unnecessary to consider. These corporations had the
same right that individuals have to make their own contract. The court has no power
to add to it or take from it.
Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, -, 43 A. 503, 506 (1899).
Indeed, a New York court made the point most vigorously: "It [the insurance company]
... was under no legal obligation, whether express or implied, to compromise or settle the
claims prior to the trial." Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, -, 140 N.E. 577,
579 (1923) (emphasis added). See also C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,
244 Pa. 286, 90 A. 653 (1914).
14. Miller, Living with Bad Faith, 46 INS. COUNSEL J. 34, 34 (1979).
15. 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914).
16. Id. at __, 104 N.E. at 624.
17. See also Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949); Hilker v.
Western Auto Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), aff'd on rehearing, 204 Wis. 1, 235
N.W. 413 (1931).
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of the other to receive the benefits of an agreement.' s Judicial standards
were later established to measure the company's conduct in dealing with
its insured.
III. THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS
A. The Good Faith Standard
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing provided a basis
for the good faith standard. A breach of the duty to use good faith'" re-
sults in a breach of contract.20 If an insured can prove the insurer exer-
cised "bad faith" in not settling a claim, the insurer will be held liable for
an excess judgment.2' Although there are some guidelines as to what ac-
tions may in fact constitute a breach of the duty of good faith,22 jurisdic-
tions applying this standard have assessed varying weight to the impact
of several factors, and consequently there is no uniform criterion for de-
termining liability. It is therefore conceivable that two cases presenting
very similar factual situations would be decided differently.2
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Price,24 the Virginia Supreme Court
18. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
19. Although the insurer retains the exclusive power under the insurance contract to de-
fend or settle, the exercise of this power does not involve the assumption of any duty to use
due care, nor can the law impose such a duty. Since the reservation of power and control
over settlements is for the protection of the insurer, he must be allowed some discretion in
the use of this power. While the insurer is not to arbitrarily disregard the insured's interests,
to hold him to the standard of due care in the conduct of settlement negotiations would
deprive him of this discretion. Liability of Insurer for Judgment in Excess of Policy Limits,
48 MICH. L. REV. 95, 98-99 (1949).
20. See Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914); Tort of Bad
Faith: A Perspective Look at the Insurer's Expanding Liability, 8 CUM. L. REV. 241, 263
(1977). See also Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 178-83 (1955).
21. See, e.g., Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1958);
Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), afl'd on rehearing, 204
Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413 (1931).
22. Certain acts which may constitute bad faith on the part of the insurance company are:
1) disregard of the claims manager's authorization to settle, 2) failure to listen to defense
counsel's advice, 3) failure to keep the insured advised of all correspondence and proceed-
ings regarding negotiations, 4) failure to investigate properly, 5) failure to affirmatively ex-
plore settlement, 6) failure to consider the claimant's demands within reasonable time, 7)
inducement of the insured to contribute, and 8) failure to consider the insured's interests.
Miller, supra note 14, at 36.
23. Compare Lawson & Nelson Sash & Door Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 204 Minn.
50, 282 N.W. 481 (1938) (attempt to coerce insured into contributing to settlement is not
bad faith) with Spang Baking Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 68 N.E.2d 122 (Ohio App.
1946) (attempt to coerce insured into contributing to settlement is bad faith).
24. 206 Va. 749, 146 S.E.2d 220 (1966). See 53 VA. L. REV. 181, 222 (1967).
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considered what actions by an insurer would constitute bad faith in Vir-
ginia. In that case, the insured, a doctor, was sued for malpractice in ren-
dering the claimant permanently disabled as a result of alleged negligent
treatment subsequent to the claimant's birth. Throughout the litigation
the insured had denied any liability to the claimant. The insurer's de-
fense counsel undertook an investigation of the case which included his
own independent medical study as well as interviews with several promi-
nent doctors in all areas of medicine. The insurer reached the conclusion
that the case was one of "no liability." Settlement was subsequently of-
fered for $5,000 below the policy limit. The insurer failed to accept the
settlement offer and an excess judgment over twice the policy limit was
rendered. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the insurer was not
guilty of bad faith and therefore was not liable for an excess judgment on
account of its failure to settle for the following reasons: 1) it had made a
comprehensive investigation extending over a period of six years; 2) it
had advised its insured of the opportunity to settle within policy limits
and had supported its insured's continuous denial of liability by its own
investigations; and 3) its refusal to accept a settlement recommendation
by its attorney was insufficient, by itself, to sustain a charge of bad
faith.25 Since the insured had paid a specific premium for a fixed amount
of insurance, he was entitled to only that amount of recovery and had to
bear the excess where there was no showing of bad faith. According to the
court, it was not bad faith to forego settlement where an insured had
made an honest and intelligent decision based on diligent investigation of
the facts and a fair weighing of the probabilities of an excess judgment.26
The Virginia Supreme Court, in making its decision, relied on an earlier
New Jersey case, Radio Taxi Service, Inc. v. Lincoln Mutual Insurance
Co. 2 7 which held: "Where reasonable and probable cause appears for re-
jecting a settlement offer and for defending the damage action, the good
faith of the insurer will be vindicated .
B. The Negligence Standard
Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.29 laid the foundation
upon which subsequent California cases were to adopt the negligence
standard. The California Supreme Court held that the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing requires the insurer to settle in an appropri-
25. 206 Va. at 762-64, 146 S.E.2d at 228-30.
26. Id. at 762, 146 S.E.2d at 228.
27. 31 N.J. 299, 157 A.2d 319 (1960).
28. Id. at -, 157 A.2d at 323.
29. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
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ate case, even though the express terms of the policy do not impose such
a duty."0 In the court's opinion, an appropriate case for settlement exists
when there is a great risk of recovery beyond the policy limits so that the
most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is a settlement made
within the policy coverage.3 1
The landmark decision of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.33 incorpo-
rated not only the Comunale decision, but broadened its scope to include
liability for mental distress. The insured, Mrs. Crisci, was sued by a third
party for injuries sustained as a result of a fall on her property. The third
party claimant offered to settle its case for $9,000, which was $1,000 be-
low Mrs. Crisci's policy limit. Mrs. Crisci's insurer had been advised that
if the case went to trial and the claimant won an award for psychosis
allegedly resulting from her fall, the award would be at least $100,000.
The insurer was also aware that the psychiatrists were divided as to
whether the fall precipitated psychosis. Therefore, the insurer refused to
accept the settlement offer, believing that the jury would not accept the
claimant's psychiatric testimony. Nevertheless, an excess judgment was
rendered for $100,000. In an attempt to satisfy the judgment, the seventy
year old Mrs. Crisci became indigent, suicidal, and hysterical. She
brought an action against Security to collect the excess judgment and
damages for negligent infliction of mental distress.
In rendering its decision, the California Supreme Court reiterated that
under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the insurer was bound
to use due care to protect the insured's interests. Through the insurance
contract, the insurer had assumed the responsibility of acting as the ex-
clusive agent of the insured and therefore, in determining whether to set-
tle, it had a duty to give the interests of the insured at least as much
consideration as it gave to its own interests.3 The test to determine
whether Security considered Mrs. Crisci's interests in settlement was
"whether a prudent insurer without policy limits would have accepted the
settlement offer."3 4 In this case, a prudent insurer would have settled be-
30. Id. at -, 328 P.2d at 201. This decision is a departure from the good faith standard.
A court applying the good faith standard does not interpret the implied covenant of good
faith to require an insurer to settle in any case. As long as objective facts exist which sup-
port the insurer's decision not to settle, the judgment will be upheld.
31. Id. The court stated that the "decisive factor" in establishing the insurer's liability "is
not the refusal to defend; it is the refusal to accept an offer of settlement within the policy
limits." Id.
32. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
33. Id. at -' 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
34. Id. at -' 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. This means that the insurer must act
as though it alone would be liable for the entire amount of any judgment. Note, Insurer's
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cause there was a considerable risk of substantial recovery beyond the
policy limits. 5 Both the insurer's attorney and claims manager knew that
all the evidence favored the third party claimant; it was unreasonable for
them to believe otherwise. Should an insurer decide to litigate the claim
in light of these considerations, it would do so at its own risk. If it would
reap the benefits of its determination not to settle, it should likewise suf-
fer the detriments of its decision.3 6 In Crisci, the insurer did not give as
much consideration to the financial interests of its insured as it gave to
its own interests. The court considered this action tortious7 and as a re-
sult, regular tort damages were recoverable. The insurer was thus liable
for any injuries incurred by its insured as a proximate result of the negli-
gent performance of its duty."8
The California court recognized that the insured reasonably expects the
amount of its policy will be used to avoid liability. In view of this expec-
tation and the conflict of interests between the parties, it was imperative
that a strict standard be imposed on the insurer to prohibit it from fur-
thering its own interests at the expense of the insured. The court has
made subsequent decisions which have extended the Crisci decision.3 9 It
has been said that these post-Crisci cases have led to an unannounced
policy of strict liability in California.40
IV. COMPARISON OF THE STANDARDS
There are several advantages and disadvantages inherent in the appli-
cation of both the negligence and good faith standards. Since the courts
have stopped short of introducing strict liability in holding an insurer lia-
ble, practitioners are confined to litigate on the basis of these two stan-
dards only. In determining which standard Virginia should apply, a com-
Liability for Refusal to Settle: Beyond Strict Liability, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 751, 760 (1977).
35. 66 Cal. 2d at -, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
36. Id. at -, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
37. Id. at -, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
38. The unique feature of this decision is that the court found no reason to distinguish
between mental distress accompanying personal injury and that accompanying an invasion
of property rights. The main reason for limiting such damages in the past has been the fear
of fictitious claims and litigation of trivialities. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 51 (4th
ed. 1971). The implications of viewing the failure to settle as tortious are obvious. Not only
is the insurer held to a strict standard of care consistent with public expectations, but it can
also be held liable for any damages proximately caused by its acts.
39. See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 843 (1979); Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9,
538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
40. Johansen v. California State Auto Ass'n: Has California Adopted Strict Liability for
an Insurer's Failure to Settle?, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 911 (1976).
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parison between the standards should be made in light of legal, economic
and social concerns.
A. Legal Concerns
Traditionally, legal obligations and causes of action have been divided
into two categories-those arising out of tort and those arising out of con-
tract. For years, insurance companies have been protected from extra-
contractual duties and liabilities as a result of this distinction. This im-
munity, however, is slowly withering away.
One of the major developments that has helped to pierce the insurer's
immunity is judicial recognition that liability in tort may co-exist with
liability in contract.41 Under many types of agreements, not only are con-
tractual duties brought into being by the will of the parties, but there are
also duties prescribed by law as incidents of the relationship 2 which the
parties have created by their agreement. 43 One court has thus expressed
that "[t]he existence of a contractual relationship does not immunize a
tortfeasor from tort liability for his wrongful acts in breach of the con-
tract."44 Similarly, insurance companies can no longer rely on the contrac-
tual character of an insurance policy to insulate themselves from liability
beyond that stated in the contract. Courts are shifting in the direction of
imposing tort liability for several reasons.
One of the main reasons for the shift is that more courts are recogniz-
ing that the insurer is a fiduciary to its insured. This relationship is based
on several factors. First, the insurer maintains exclusive control of settle-
ment proceedings, foreclosing the insured from taking any action on his
own behalf. The insurer therefore has an affirmative duty to initiate set-
tlement negotiations with the insured's interests foremost in mind.45 Sec-
ond, the insured relies on the insurer for protection from liability. He is
paying premiums for the specific purpose of freedom from economic ruin.
He reasonably expects that his policy limit will be available to avoid lia-
41. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d at -, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18;
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d at -, 328 P.2d at 203. Both decisions
allowed the insured to elect under which theory to bring an action. The benefit of the con-
tract theory provided a longer statute of limitations. Under tort, however, greater damages
could have been awarded.
42. A fiduciary relationship may be recognized between an insurer and its insured. Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974); Note, Insurer's
Liability for Refusal to Settle: Beyond Strict Liability, supra note 34, at 761-62 n.57 (1977).
43. Langdon & Sytsma, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and the Pre-Adjudi-
catory Role of the Insurance Company Advocate, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 309, 310 (1978).
44. Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807, -, 249 P.2d 257, 260 (1952).
45. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
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bility. Thus, the insurer must perform the function which it holds itself
out as rendering in accordance with the insured's expectations. Third, the
insured relies on the expertise of the insurer in settling his claims. The
insurer must maintain the standard of conduct that a reasonably prudent
insurer with the same qualifications would exhibit. Finally, the insured
does not enter the relationship entirely on his own free will. Since insur-
ance today is almost an economic necessity, the public has no choice to
"take it" or "leave it." Thus, the burden of possible tort liability must be
placed on insurers to ensure that they exercise their fiduciary duties in a
responsible manner.46
The negligence standard is consistent with the insurer's fiduciary du-
ties. It injects a standard of reasonableness into a determination of liabil-
ity and places a higher duty of care on the insurer for the benefit of the
insured. If there is a great risk of recovery beyond the policy limits, in
light of the circumstances, then the most reasonable manner of disposing
of the claim is to settle. If the insurer fails to settle, it then bears the
burden of an excess judgment. This seems equitable since the insurer in
all likelihood has the assets to carry the burden of an excess judgment
with little hardship, while an insured may be financially ruined by such a
judgment.
The good faith standard, on the other hand, does not impose a fiduci-
ary duty on the insurer. Such a duty is neither necessary nor consistent
with a standard of liability which imposes no duty of care on an insurer.4 7
Although the Virginia Supreme Court has recognized that the relation-
ship between the insured and insurer is one of confidence and trust which
imposes upon the insurer the duty to deal fairly with the insured, it has
not specifically recognized the standard of care required of a fiduciary.48
Another reason for the shift to tort theory is that simple contract dam-
ages cannot adequately compensate the insured. Under the negligence
standard, compensation is awarded for all damages proximately caused by
the insurer's actions. The insurer should know or foresee, at the time of
46. In a sense, the insurer is held to a fiduciary duty not only because of the nature of its
relationship to the insured, but also because of its relation to the public as a quasi-public
business, rather than an ordinary self-interested business. Good Faith and Fair Dealing in
Insurance Contracts: Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 25 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 711 (1974).
47. The Virginia General Assembly however, has imposed a duty of good faith in the
Unfair Trade Practices Act. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-52(8a) (Cum. Supp. 1979). Whenever the
law creates a duty, the breach of such duty, coupled with consequent damage, will be a tort.
Langdon & Sytsma, supra note 43, at 314. Thus it seems that Virginia may have left the
avenue of a tort action open in some cases. The statute has not yet been interpreted by the
state courts.
48. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Price, 206 Va. 749, 146 S.E.2d 220 (1966).
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contracting, that the insured may suffer the very injury from which he
seeks protection. We see from Crisci that precedent has been established
for recovery of damages for mental distress. Such damages are not recov-
erable under the narrow scope of contract theory except in situations
where a contract directly concerns the emotional well-being of a con-
tracting party.49
Another criticism of the good faith standard is that it is too subjective
and allows the insurer to be the "judge" in his own case.50 This standard
seems to instruct the insurer to weigh his own interests on the same scale
with those of its insured.5 ' However, such a conflict of interest is too great
to guarantee that the insured will be dealt with fairly. Jurisdictions using
the good faith standard have interpreted bad faith several different ways
because of the latitude insurers have in considering their own interests. In
this regard, tort law may be more equitable than contract law in its insis-
tence that cases similar in facts be treated in the same fashion.52
The negligence standard, on the other hand, works as a deterrent to
wayward insurers who are inclined to consider their own interests as par-
amount to those of their insured. Under the good faith standard, the in-
surer undoubtedly cannot avoid being influenced by the knowledge that
as long as it makes a good faith judgment regarding settlement based on
supportable evidence obtained from a diligent investigation, it will not
bear the responsibility for an excess judgment. This may actually cause
the insurer to litigate more often. However, under the negligence stan-
dard, the insurer will not be as willing to take risks where it knows there
is a greater possibility of being held to pay an excess judgment.
Several commentators have found both the negligence standard and the
good faith standard unworkable. 53 One commentator has strongly criti-
49. An example of such a situation would be the negligent embalming of a member of
claimant's family or the negligent bailment of heirlooms.
50. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d,495 (1975).
51. Id. at -, 323 A.2d at 509; The Emerging Fiduciary Obligations and Strict Liability
in Insurance Law, 14 CALIF. W.L. REV. 358, 371 (1978).
52. Ross, Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims Adjustment, in
PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 86, 89 (1976).
53. A major problem with both standards is that they create what is referred to as the
"Culpability-Liability Inverse Relationship" anomaly. Where a settlement opportunity ex-
ists, it seems the more faultless the client appears, the more likely he is of being subjected
to all the dangers of a trial of the case by his insurer. The more culpable an insured is, the
less likely he will be exposed to an excess judgment, because the insurer will not risk going
to trial where no doubt exists that a judgment will be rendered against the insured. This is
an undesirable result. The purpose of the legal system is to ensure that liability is imposed
only on those persons who are culpable, and not on those who are free from blame. See
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cized the use of the jury in excess judgment suits54 as being grossly in-
competent to determine what is reasonableness or negligence in an area
where it is not knowledgeable. This is not a new criticism of the lay jury;
however, it seems to manifest itself in excess judgment cases where the
helpless insured is fighting the big insurance company. No juror relishes
the thought that he may be faced with the same problem someday. Thus,
liability is imposed on the basis of pure emotion rather than a fair weigh-
ing of the facts.5 5 One solution is to have the court decide the questions of
negligence and bad faith.5 6 Another solution, suggested by an increasing
number of commentators, is to apply strict liability.57
One further point, in view of the standards imposed, is that settlements
are necessary to the function of the legal system. Without the mechanism
of settlements, the court system would become overburdened and thus
unresponsive to the need for timely resolution of lawsuits. No doubt
judges are aware of this consideration, and may favor imposing a stricter
standard on insurers to encourage the settlement of claims, thereby leav-
ing only irreconcilable differences for the courts to decide.
The negligence standard encourages insurers to settle, if for no other
reason than to avoid liability for an excess judgment. One drawback to
the standard, however, is that it may ignore the economic concerns of the
insured when calculating the amount to offer within the policy coverage.
B. Economic Concerns
The negligence standard purports to protect the insured's interests to a
higher degree than the good faith standard. The test enunciated in
Crisci5 8 requires that two factors be considered before liability is imposed
on an insurer for falling below the standard of reasonableness. These con-
siderations may in effect disregard the financial interests of the insured
when a decision concerning settlement is being made.
Note, Insurer's Liability for Refusal to Settle: Beyond Strict Liability, supra note 34, at
774.
Additionally, many writers believe that there is really no difference between the two stan-
dards. They contend that the same actions are proscribed under both standards, and that
many of the results would be the same, regardless of differences in verbiage. See, e.g., 7C J.
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4712, at 425 (1979); Keeton, supra note 7, at
1140.
54. Appleman, supra note 11, at 109-11.
55. See Thornton & Blaut, Bad Faith and Insurers: Compensatory and Punitive Dam-
ages, 12 FORUM 699, 719-20 (1977).
56. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1976).
57. See note 7 supra.
58. See text accompanying" notes 33-34 supra.
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The first consideration questions whether an insurer would have settled
had the policy been unlimited. If the policy is unlimited, it is easy to see
that an insurer will behave as a person of almost unlimited wealth and
play the averages.5 9 The insurer will estimate the settlement value of the
claim by determining what settlement value over a series of similar cases
would result in the least overall expense to the company.60 In the major-
ity of cases however, the policy provides limited coverage and the insured
is a person of moderate means. The insured demands that an offer be
made below his policy limits, yet sufficient to induce the claimant to set-
tle. The insurer, on the other hand, would simply base the amount for
settlement on averages and the lowest overall cost to the company. This
conflict of interests must be resolved in favor of the insured.
The second factor inquires whether the insurer gave as much considera-
tion to the insured's interests as to its own. An answer to this question
directly concerns the financial status of the insured. If the insured is
judgment-proof, or a person of considerable wealth, he may prefer to take
the risks that litigation entails rather than consider settlement. As a re-
sult of their financial condition, these insureds would probably act much
like the insurer under an unlimited policy. The insured of moderate
means, however, would try harder to settle because of the risk of an ex-
cess judgment, which could have a devastating effect on his economic sta-
tus. Thus, the insured of moderate means is always forced to consider
settlement, whereas the wealthy or judgment-proof insured is seldom
faced with the problems of settlement. 1
The good faith standard has also been attacked on similar grounds.
Under this standard, insurers may ignore the financial interests of the
insured in settling and litigate a claim for "institutional" purposes.6 2 For
example, in an effort to keep total settlement costs down, insurance com-
panies occasionally adopt "no settlement" or "selective settlement" pro-
grams to "numb the public's claim-consciousness, to fight organized
fraudulent claims, or to create a tight-fisted image for plaintiffs' attor-
neys."63 If a case involves a disputed legal point, the insurer may again
litigate to establish favorable precedent, 4 even though the costs of litiga-
59. Note, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule,
18 STAN. L. REV. 475, 477 (1966).
60. Id.
61. Keeton, supra note 7, at 1147 n. 26.
62. Note, An Insurance Company's Duty to Settle: Qualified or Absolute?, 41 S. CAL. L.
REV. 120, 128 (1968).
63. Note, Excess Liability: Reconsideration of California's Bad Faith Negligence Rule,
supra note 59, at 482.
64. Id. at 483.
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tion outweigh the cost of settlement. 5
Litigating for institutional purposes may not be as repugnant as it first
appears, since it is one way insurers combat specious claims and thereby
benefit all insureds. The problem which exists, however, is that it is diffi-
cult to ascertain whether the insurer is litigating for his own interests or
for institutional concerns.6 6 This in itself suggests the need for a stricter
standard.17
A major criticism of the negligence standard is that premiums will rise
directly in proportion to the rise in liability. Insureds who fear the al-
ready exorbitant premiums dread further increases. A counter-argument
was posed by one commentator" who states that the possibility of in-
creased premiums is not necessarily objectionable if the basic social aim
of spreading losses by means of insurance is furthered. 9 Loss-spreading
will minimize economic dislocation and consequent social dislocation.7 0 It
will shift the burden of paying an excess judgment from the insured to
the insurer, the one most able to bear the hardship.7 1 Furthermore, the
burden of an increase in premiums is distributed among all insureds. It
may even be doubtful whether the cost of making reasonable settlements
in the majority of cases would largely exceed the cost of meeting the occa-
sional excess judgment for which the insurer is now liable.7 2
Another closely related criticism of the negligence standard is that bus-
iness risks associated with insurance contracts are increased by holding
an insurer to a stricter standard of care.7 3 This argument, however, is of
65. Pretzel, Economics of Trial Versus Settlement, 1965 INs. L.J. 453, 460.
66. Approaching Strict Liability of Insurer for Refusing to Settle Within Policy Limits,
47 NEB. L. REV. 705, 719 (1968).
67. Professor Keeton suggests that many of the problems and criticisms of the negligence
standard could be alleviated by combining the equal consideration and negligence aspects of
the standard in a different form. Keeton, supra note 7, at 1147.
68. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, in PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 142 (1976).
69. Id. at 145. "Loss spreading" can have several meanings. The first possible meaning is
the accomplishment of the broadest possible spreading of losses, both over people and over
time. The second is the placing of losses on those classes of people that are best able to pay,
usually the wealthiest. A third meaning places the losses on those activities that engendered
them.
70. Id.
71. Income from insurance companies constitutes an appreciable share of the national
wealth and income. Thirty years ago insurance companies owned over a hundred billion
dollars of assets. The figures today are even more staggering. Surely, it is far from inequita-
ble to hold an insurer liable for excess judgments when it acts negligently. S. KIMBALL, IN-
SURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (1960).
72. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 173 n.8 (1955).
73. Note, Insured is Entitled to Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by an Insurer's
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little merit. Insurance companies are risk-takers. Moreover, the Crisci
court specifically held that an insurance contract is not an agreement
signed in contemplation of one party obtaining a commercial advantage
over another party.7 4 Normal business risks are not involved. Since insur-
ance companies have moved away from the traditional business setting 5
and are now considered social institutions, they are responsible for ab-
sorbing risks of accidental losses and must also take social and public
concerns into consideration.
C. Social Concerns
Insurance is an institution whereby economic loss is distributed among
a large number of persons who are subject to the risk of such loss. The
risk is transferred to the insurer in exchange for a premium paid in ad-
vance. The cost of these premiums is directly related to the predictable
amount of loss from accepting the risks. Undoubtedly, the most compel-
ling reasons for adopting the negligence standard arise from the relation-
ship that develops between the insured and the insurer when contracting
for insurance.
The insurance industry in general has been regarded as a business af-
fected with a public interest.76 Specifically, the purpose of liability insur-
ance is twofold: to protect the insured from fear of liability for his ac-
tions, and to adequately compensate the injured party. As a result,
insureds have developed certain expectations with regard to the disposi-
tion of claims against them.7
7
Perhaps most importantly, the insured expects peace of mind from the
knowledge that he is secure from financial ruin. Secondly, he expects the
insurer to dispose of claims intelligently and quickly and with the exper-
tise that insurers are considered to possess. He relies on the insurer's sta-
tus as a professional, 8 because he is foreclosed from protecting his own
interests. Finally, the insured expects that the amount of his policy will
Wrongful Rejection of a Reasonable Settlement Within the Limits of the Insurance Policy,
46 Tsx. L. REv. 113, 118 (1967).
74. 66 Cal. 2d at -, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
75. Insurance companies were early regarded as normal business concerns. This view was
consistent with the early twentieth century American attitude that laissez-faire and freedom
of contract promoted the growth of financial capitalism. S. KIMBALL, supra note 71, at 304.
See also Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911
(1928).
76. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 79 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1969).
77. See R. KEETON, supra note 10, at 351 (1971).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
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be available in settlement negotiations to avoid liability.79
The negligence standard protects these expectations by imposing a
strict standard of due care on the insurer. In refusing to settle where
there is a fair possibility that an excess verdict may be rendered, the in-
surer is trying to avoid the liability which he was paid to assume;80 he is
jeopardizing the tranquility and secure economic status for which the in-
sured paid a premium. It is justified, therefore, that the insurer be liable
for its wrongful act and pay all damages incurred by the insured proxi-
mately resulting therefrom. The insurer cannot be allowed to hide behind
contract principles to limit its liability.8
The good faith standard is derived from contract theory. Theie is no
question as to whether due care was exhibited. The level of conduct,
therefore, may not be sufficiently demanding to reasonably conform to
the public's expectations. When the insurer fails to accept a settlement, it
may not necessarily be liable for a consequent excess judgment if it has
conducted all affairs with its insured in a proper manner.82 A further diffi-
culty arises when the insured attempts to get reimbursed for the excess
judgment. The burden of proof is high for the insured to overcome; it is
the rare case where a finding will be made that the insurer acted without
any good faith justification. 83 On the other hand, under the negligence
standard adopted by the California courts, the insurer bears the burden
of showing that the demand was unreasonable and that he could not ac-
cept the offer for that reason.8
79. The Crisci court held that this was not an unreasonable expectation. 66 Cal. 2d at_,
426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
80. See Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 378 P.2d 579, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1963). See also
note 11 supra.
81. The duties of public service companies "do not flow from agreements which the public
servant may make as he chooses, they flow from the calling in which he has engaged and his
consequent relation to the public." Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, _, 419 P.2d 168,
172 n.6, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107-08 (1966) (quoting PouND, THE SPnur OF COMMON LAW 29
(1921)).
82. See text at notes 25-26 supra.
83. Appleman, Duty of Liability Insurer to Compromise Litigation, 26 Ky. L. J. 100, 110
(1938).
84. This is a difficult burden for the insurer to overcome because in following a principal
suit won by the claimant, it is unlikely that the outcome or the damages would be inaccu-
rately determined. Furthermore, California law applies a rebuttable presumption that where
a judgment over the policy limits is rendered, any previous demand under the limits is held
reasonable. Note, Insurer's Liability for Refisal to Settle: Beyond Strict Liability, supra
note 53, at 760. However, in other courts applying the negligence standard, the insurer does
not have this burden. California has simply taken a step further in defining the limits or
magnitude of liability under the negligence standard.
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A higher standard of care may be necessary to bring about an internal
change within the industry. Most claims adjusters approach their work
with conventional business values which make them inclined to seek low,
conservative settlements85 Settlement figures are usually far from ideal.
Organizational pressures may require the company to "close files" quick-
ly, foreclosing the opportunity to make adequate investigation of the par-
ticular claim.86 These institutional interests may overshadow the in-
sured's interests. Imposing liability more liberally through the negligence
standard may cause the claims adjuster to take a second look at the claim
before closing the file. He may be protecting his own job in doing so.
Moving to a broader area of concern, it has been suggested that the
negligence standard could encourage fictitious claims, claims-conscious
plaintiffs and collusion.87 The imposition of higher standards of conduct
may cause insurers to capitulate and settle rather than risk an excess
judgment. Coupled with this problem is the possibility that claimants will
make demands for amounts close to the policy limits, believing that in-
surers will settle for any amount below the limit.88 One might argue that
an insured would not attempt any collusive agreements with the claimant
because it would defeat his asserted interest in settlement. This is not
always true. As long as the demand reached by the collusive agreement
was below policy limits, the insured's interests in settlement would still
be promoted.8e
The good faith standard works to combat any specious claim. 0 The
insured would not risk any collusive agreements where the duty of an
insurer to settle is not high. Furthermore, only economically foolish
claimants would litigate a "no dispute" claim in a good faith jurisdiction
where the insurer is virtually free to challenge any claim.
The negligence standard is the logical extension of a growing movement
85. Ross, Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims Adjustment, in
PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 86, 87 (1976).
86. "The closing of files represents for adjusters something of the same kind of central
goal as the attainment of good grades represents for the college student. . . ." Id. at 88.
87. See Note, Insurer's Liability for Refusal to Settle: Beyond Strict Liability, supra
note 53, at 779-81.
88. Id. at 780-81.
89. There is no major problem with this behavior. Such a collusive agreement could only
be marginally profitable for both parties where there is a requirement that the amount be
kept within policy coverage. These problems are further dispelled by the fact that most
insurance policies require the insured to cooperate with the insurer in disposing of the
claim.
90. Approaching Strict Liability for Insurer for Refusing to Settle Within Policy Limits,
supra note 66, at 719.
168 [Vol. 15:153
EXCESS JUDGMENTS
in "consumer activism." Liability has been expanded in products liability
and malpractice cases to persons who have the power to control the oc-
currence or nonoccurrence of an act.91 Where persons hold themselves out
as possessing a high degree of skill and expertise in a particular field, or
Where they alone are able to control an event, they should be liable in tort
for misfeasance.
Insurers should not be allowed to use qualifications and exceptions
from liability that are inconsistent with the bargaining power between the
parties, even if such exclusions are explicit and unambiguous. Insurers
know that ordinary policyholders do not read their policies with the de-
gree of care that is required for moderate understanding. 2 Such policies
are difficult to understand without detailed study. If the insurer made it
clear to the policyholder at the time of contracting that it was making
specific qualifications in the policy, this might be sufficient for effective
notice. No doubt only a minority of insurers make it a practice to ade-
quately inform policyholders.93 If the practice of non-disclosure cannot be
prevented through legislation, it should be stopped by the courts' applica-
tion of greater liability to compensate for harm already suffered. The
good faith standard will not provide this protection to the insured who is
forced to litigate.
Virginia, like many states, has enacted an Unfair Trade Practices Act9
which contains a section on unfair claim settlement practices.95 The stat-
91. The courts have imposed higher standards of care on manufacturers in products lia-
bility cases, on employers under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and on attorneys,
doctors, accountants, architects and engineers in malpractice cases. Insurance carriers are
the next group to be added to the list.
92. R. KWrON, supra note 7, at 351-52.
93. Id.
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-52.9 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
95. The relevant parts of the statute read as follows:
Unfair claim settlement practices. - No person shall commit or perform with such
frequency as to indicate a general business practice any of the following:
(1) Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to cover-
ages at issue;
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with
respect to claims arising under insurance policies;
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investiga-
tion of claims arising under insurance policies;
(6) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settle-
ments of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;
(7) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered
in actions brought by such insureds;
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ute is a move in the right direction towards recognition of a duty to settle
claims fairly. A major defect in the Act, however, is that before any viola-
tion can be found, the conduct specified must be performed with such
frequency as to indicate a general business practice. Since the courts have
not yet had an opportunity to interpret the statute, no guideline as to the
frequency necessary to constitute a general business practice exists. It is
hopeful that the courts will give a broad interpretation to the phrase.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the past fifty years, the courts have expressed several different
attitudes regarding an insurer's liability for failing to settle claims. In the
landmark case of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., the California court
held that mere negligence on the part of an insurer for failing to settle
was sufficient to hold it liable for an excess judgment. This decision com-
pleted a move away from the traditional view that the insurer was under
no duty to settle a claim, and has caused the courts across the country to
once again reevaluate the doctrinal basis for imposing liability on an
insurer.
Virginia has addressed this issue only once in Aetna, a case decided
before Crisci and consequently based on the good faith standard, the ma-
jority rule in 1966, whereby the insurer is liable for an excess judgment
only if it exercises bad faith in settling a claim. The trend, however, is
clearly moving in the direction of Crisci." Although both the good faith
and negligence standards suffer from some inadequacies, the latter stan-
dard appears preferable because it fulfills public expectations and is more
consistent with the growing concern for consumer protection. Economic
and social considerations demand that a higher standard of conduct be
(8) Attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable
man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed advertis-
ing material accompanying or made part of an application;
(14) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insur-
ance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a claim or for the
offer of a compromise settlement.
Id.
96. Some of the most noted cases are: United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Glens Falls Ins. Co.,
350 F. Supp. 869 (D. Conn. 1972); Campbell v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525
(Fla. 1974); Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care, 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d
540 (1975); Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 161 Ind. App. 413, 316 N.E.2d 381 (1974);
Koppie v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v.
Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974); Wasserman v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co.,
29 Ohio App. 2d 7, 277 N.E.2d 569 (1972); Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273
N.E.2d 919 (1970).
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placed on insurers as they have exclusive control of settlement negotia-
tions, the power to protect their insureds from financial ruin, and the re-
sources to pay the judgment. The integration of tort and contract princi-
ples no longer enables an insurer to rely exclusively on the contract to
define its duties and liabilities.
Although the negligence standard need not be applied as strictly as the
criteria in the Crisci case mandate, policy considerations require that Vir-
ginia courts reevaluate the use of the good faith standard when again con-
fronted with an excess judgment suit.
Barbara A. Dalvano

